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1. Introduction 
Policymakers routinely use announcements as policy instruments to influence future 
expectations. The well known announcement or signal effect, in fact, implies that the 
announcement of a change in policy will affect agents’ behaviour, even before the change is 
actually put into effect. Rational policymakers should thus internalize announcement effects 
and use signals strategically. The economic policy literature however does not have a formal 
model of whether, and under what conditions, policy announcements can affect economic 
performance. But the conventional wisdom is that policy announcements are likely to prove 
ineffective or inconsistent with private expectations. That in turn is inconsistent with the very 
evident attempts by governments and central banks to manage expectations. Is it then 
* The authors are grateful to R. Neck for useful discussions and comments on an earlier draft. Nicola Acocella 
and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo thank the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ for funding. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo 
also acknowledges the financial support of the European Union (Marie Curie ToK, contract No 014288, MTKD-
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reasonable that they should try? 
        Although announcements are often used strategically by policymakers in many areas,1
the work of Barro (1974), Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Lucas (1976) has led many people 
to regard policy announcements, and commitments to achieve certain policy targets, with 
suspicion in a world with forward-looking expectations. Time inconsistency and rational 
expectations are said to imply that such commitments cannot be considered credible and 
would inevitably lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. However, the credibility problem can be 
solved in a repeated game context (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). In 
that context, there would be no need for the private sector to adjust their expectations of the 
outcomes as a result of the government’s interventions. And for reputation, the policymaker 
can mimic a forthright type who always honours policy announcements. In this context, the 
final few periods of the game apart, policy signals are always credible. Applications have 
been made to a vast array of credibility problems. 
        In this paper we approach the problem from a fresh perspective, by considering 
endogenous or rational expectations directly in a traditional Tinbergen framework and 
showing that under certain circumstances the usual dichotomy between rational expectations, 
on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness or time inconsistency of policy actions on the other, 
may not arise. We show that, if expectations are rational, policy invariance and time 
inconsistency emerge only in the special case of a Tinbergen flexible targets problem. In the 
more general case – that is in an unconstrained optimisation (free from externally imposed 
preferences or optimisation techniques) and where policymakers can be said to control the 
economic system either statically or dynamically – the endogenization of expectations will 
not only present the policymakers with no problem of how to set their policies consistently; 
but may actually add to the scope of their policy instruments, in effect giving them additional 
sources of effective policy power. Our contribution is therefore to bridge the gap between the 
practice and what our traditional policy models tell us. 
        This essay is one in a line of papers rehabilitating the theory of economic policy, 
extended so far to multiple policymakers and strategic policy games.2 In this paper we add 
rational expectations to the classical theory in a single policymaker context and derive the 
conditions for both static and dynamic controllability for that case. It is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the reduced and final form of a model with a single policymaker and 
1 See Persson and Tabellini (1990) for a general survey; and Blinder et al. (2008), Woodford (2005), or 
Rudebusch and Williams (2008) for examples in central banking. Instances in the financial markets will be found 
in Balduzzi et al. (2001), Andersen et al. (2003), Fair (2003) and Faust et al. (2007).
2 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2006), Acocella et al. (2006, 2007),  Di Bartolomeo et al. (2008). 
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rational expectations. In section 3 we deal with the conditions for static and dynamic 
controllability of this model and demonstrate that dynamic controllability can be enhanced by 
rational expectations. We also derive the rational expectations version of Wonham’s (1974) 
stabilisability theorem. Section 4 concludes with some implications for policy design.
2. The economic model with a single policymaker 
Without loss of generality, we can write the generic linear rational expectations model, in its 
reduced form, as follows: 
(1)                 for t = 1…..Ttttttt vCxByAyy ???? ?? /11
where T is a finite, but possibly large number; and where )/( 1/1 tttt yEy ?? ??  denotes the 
mathematical expectation of conditional on 1?ty t?  (the information set available at t). In this 
set up,  is a vector of n endogenous variables at time t;  is a vector of m potential policy 
instruments; and  is a vector of exogenous shocks and/or other influences which have a 
known mean, but come from an unspecified probability distribution. We assume, as is 
conventional in this literature, that none of the endogenous variables in  contains a unit 
root. Likewise, the matrices A, B and C are constant and of order n, n, and n?m respectively, 
and have at least some elements which are non-zero. 
ty tx
tv
ty
        This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, say t=1, by 
putting it into final form conditional on the information set available in that period:3
(2)
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In this representation,  is a known initial condition at t = 1; and  is an assumed or 
projected terminal condition – most likely one that describes the economy’s expected long run 
equilibrium state as part of ?
0y 1/1?Ty
1. Although (2) has been solved from the point of view of ?1, it 
must be understood that it could have been derived for each ?t, t = 1....T, in turn where yj/t =
3 Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1988), Hughes Hallett et al. (1996). 
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Et(yj) if j?t, but yj/t = yj if j<t; and similarly for x and v. But for simplicity, we will consider the 
?1 case only in what follows. The generalisation to any other value of t is then obvious.
       Second, the equation to which (2) is the solution makes it clear that neither the 
policymakers, nor the private sector are required to move off their expected paths (make 
expectational errors) for the policies to work. In fact equation (2), also (4) below, show just 
the opposite; those expectations are exactly consistent with what private agents and 
policymakers expect the policy outcomes to be. The only question is whether policies, or 
announcements of policies, can be found that would shift the expectations path itself by the 
required amount. The task of this paper is to find the conditions under which this can be done. 
Hence our purpose is to determine when it is possible to shift expectations in such a way that 
the economy’s final outcomes can reach certain target values at specified points of time; and
when it is not possible. 
        The extension of (1), and hence (2) to allow any number of leads and lags is detailed in 
an appendix to this paper. In addition, it is easy to show that this final form solution generally 
exists, given (1), since the inverse matrix in (2) is always well defined. To see this, define the 
Toeplitz matrix itself to be: .
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This matrix is of order nT. Using the partitioning by time, the determinant of  is TT
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However 11 2 2( ,0.....0) ( ',0.....0) 'T T n TT T I B T A
?
? ? ?? ? ? ? , and so on. Hence we can write (3)        
1
1 1 1( : ) ( ' : 0) 'i i n i i nT T I B O T A T I BA
?
? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? 0? for i= 2…….T
The equalities in (3) follow from the partitioning in 11iT
?
?  and repeated applications of the 
Woodbury formula for the inverse of a matrix sum; and the inequality from the absence of 
unit roots in (1) or AB.4 But .1 nIT ?  Hence the inverse always exists by induction.
                                                
4 A weaker condition, if T??, would be the usual saddle point property (Hughes Hallett and Fisher, 1988). 
Notice that this result automatically implies that the traditional vertical Phillips curve model would not be 
controllable in the long run since TT would be lower triangular with A having a unit root (if A in (1) is associated 
with contemporaneous expectations, or lagged values as an approximation). It was our purpose to identify 
conditions when the system is not controllable, as well as when it is. The unit root condition on A (or AB in our 
more general formulation) is one; the other, a failure of the rank condition in proposition 3. 
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       Given that (2) always exists, we can now rewrite the final form model in the following 
way:   ,  or 
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where , and “ ” denotes a 
Kronecker product. In this formulation, each 
),(1 CITR T ??
? })'':0()'0:'()/({ 1/101
1
?
? ???? TT yByAvETb ?
1/1/, / jtjt xyR ???  defines an n m matrix of 
policy multipliers for t, j = 1…T. Notice also that R is not block triangular: so  even if 
t < j. In other words, equation (4) implies  is a matrix of conventional policy multipliers 
between  and , with a delay of t – j periods between implementation and realization if 
t > j. By contrast, represents a matrix of anticipatory effects on , of an announced or 
anticipated policy change  at some point in the future, if t < j.
?
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1/ty 1/jx
jtR , 1/ty
1/jx
5
3. Controllability with forward looking behaviour 
3.1 Static controllability 
Static (or Tinbergen) controllability defines the set of conditions which must hold if an 
arbitrary set of target values can be achieved for the endogenous variables  in each period – 
at least in expectation, given that the original model is stochastic. Define those target values 
to be , where superscript d denotes a desired value from the perspective of period 1. We 
then define  to be a stacked vector of those desired values across time periods. 
ty
d
ty 1/
dy
        Static controllability, in each period in turn, evidently requires the matrix R in (4) to 
possess an inverse: 
(5)                )(1 byRx d ?? ?
where y, x and b are all understood to be expectations conditioned on the current information 
set , for each t = 1…T, as noted at (2) and (4). Hence: t?
                                                
5 A conventional “backwards looking” model will have Rt,j = 0 for all t < j; and constant multipliers Rt,j = Rt,?j for 
t – j = 0…..T?1, if the model at (1) is linear. Neither of these things is true in (4). 
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Proposition 1:  
Static controllability under rational expectations, as in a conventional backwards looking 
model, requires the model to have as many independent policy instruments as target variables 
in each time period. Hence there is no generalization or change in the static controllability 
onditions when there are rational or forward looking expectations.
Proof: From (4),  where
c
T CIC TTT CTR
1?? ?? . Hence TCCTR 1111 )( ???? ??  exists if and TTTT
only if TT  exists, since we already know that T
T
11 ?? ?? CIC 1?T
ollability in a backward looking 
odel, whether static (A = 0, B = 0) or dynamic (B = 0).?
m) is sufficient. This corresponds to the conventional case studied in Hughes Hallett 
nT mT. However, if they differ across time periods, then we need mn
exists. But the instru-ment 
coefficient matrix, C, can only possess an inverse if n = m and C has full rank. Those are also 
the conditions which provide period-by-period static contr
m
Comments:
i) As always n = m, well-known as the Tinbergen theorem, is a necessary condition for static 
controllability; linear independence in the impacts of the instruments on the targets (together 
with n =
(1989).
ii) If the same number of target and instrument variables appears in each time period, then the 
necessary condition emerges directly from the matrix inverse in (5) since R is of order 
t? t?  in each period if 
static controllabi
s of linear independence within , cannot 
er
ent of  in (2) before 
roceeding with proposition 1 on the reduced system. 
, fo
lity is to hold across the whole policy period since ?CI  now becomes 
}{ tT CdiagC . The sufficient condition, in term
1?
11 ?? ? TC
be seen from R in this case. 
iii) In the event that we have surplus instruments, m > n, then we may transf m ??n of them 
from 1/tx , times their coefficients from C, to the corresponding elem 1/tv
p
3.2 Dynamic controllability 
Conventionally an economy (model) is said to be dynamically controllable if a sequence of 
instrument values t1 can be found to reach any arbitrary values, ty r the target 
variables in period t (at least in expectation), given an arbitrary starting point .0y  In that case, 
we are no longer concerned with the period-by-period controllability of the target variables 
xx ,....., d
6
between periods 1 and t ??1. Viewed from period 1, dynamic controllability t efore requires 
a sequence of intended instrument values 1/1/1 ,....., Txx  that guarantee that
d
ty 1/ is reached in 
period t. Given (4), be possible only if  of policy multipliers and 
anticipatory effects, Ttt RR ,1, ..... , is of fu nk
her
this will  sequence
ll ra
 the
: nRRr Ttt ?)....( ,1, , given an arbitrary initial 
state 0y  and a specifi inal condition .
nomy represen d by (1) is dynamically controllable over the interval (1, t), when T ?
,1, nRR ntt ?
6
).... tTtt bxR ? ), using a M re-Penrose gen
, nR Tt ?  But if T ? n, then =  which 
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e f
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icipatory e
o e
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Proposition 2:  
The e teco
n,  if (r
Proof: 1/ (
d
t Ry ? is reachable over (1, t oo eralized
left inverse, if ( 1,Rr t
.)....
1//1,
.)....  )...( ,1, Ttt RRr nRRr ntt ?)...( ,1,
provides the r
Comments:
i) Proposition 2 is an interesting and important generalization over the conventional case with 
backwards looking models. If n > t, which is entirely possibl or small values of t, dynamic 
controlla ill be available through the reactions of 1/ty  to the implemented policy 
choices 1/1/1 ... txx ; and through the ant ffects of announced or anticipated policy 
interventions that still lie in the future, ..... 1/1/1 nt xx ?  In other words, the policy maker can use 
policy announcements, in addition to actual interventions, t  the course of the economy. 
In a conventional model that would not be possible since 0,
 guid
?jtR  for all j > t. In effect, the 
policymaker now has a greater number of policy “instruments” at his disposal than in an 
policy targets in the early periods or at lower cost, a fact which has already attracted 
                                                
economy without anticipations.
ii) Corollary: all 1/ty , including the targets of the first period 1/1y , are now dynamically 
controllable if the rank condition in proposition 2 holds. That too is an important extension 
over the conventional case where period t = n is the earliest date at which we can guarantee 
controllability if there is a single policy instrument; or t = n/2 if there are two instruments, and 
so on. Here 1/1y is controllable from the first period, even if there are insufficient instruments 
(m < n), provided that both T ? n and proposition 2 holds. The astute policymaker will realise 
that good communication lies at the heart of the policy problem if he/she wants to reach their 
6 This proposition provides a sufficient condition for dynamic controllability. The corresponding necessary 
condition involves a smaller subset of Rtj having full rank depending on how many policy instruments are 
available (see section 3.4). Proposition 2 is therefore given for the general case with m ? 1. 
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considerable interest in central banking circles (Woodford 2005, Blinder et al, 2008, 
Rudebusch and Williams 2008). 
iii) Evidently dynamic controllability is also possible with a much reduced instrument set, 
compared to static controllability. There are two parts to this reduction: a) the ability to use 
one or more instruments repeatedly rather than a group of several instruments used once and 
in parallel; and b) the ability to augment, or even replace, parts of an existing instrument set 
with announcements of future policy changes. 
iv) There is also a distinction in that the values will be implemented decisions when 
it comes to the controllability of ; but that the  values, being policy 
announcements, may never actually be carried out. However, because they lie in the future 
from the perspective of , any subsequent time inconsistency plays no role in the 
controllability of as long as they are genuinely held expectations at that point. 
1/1/1 ... txx
1/ty 1/1/1 .... nt xx ?
1/ty
1/ty
v) For that reason, we have taken the first n multiplier matrices for the rank condition in 
proposition 2. That is an arbitrary choice; we could have taken any n sub-matrices from 
. But a choice of the first n maximizes the proportion which represents actual 
policy choices as opposed to potentially fungible policy announcements.  
Ttt RR ,1, .....
Proposition 3:  
Forward looking or rational expectations enhance the power to control an economy over time 
in that: a) policy announcements may be used to supplement and extend the impact of 
conventional policy instruments; and b) controllability is now available, with a reduced 
instrument set, from much earlier; and from t = 1 if .)...( 111 nRRr n ?
Proof: comments i), ii) and iii) above, and proposition 2.?
3.3 Stabilisability under rational expectations 
We can apply the reasoning underlying propositions 2 and 3 to show that any economy can 
also be stabilized to an arbitrary degree under rational, forward looking expectations if it is 
dynamically controllable in the sense of proposition 2. An arbitrary degree of stabilisation 
means that policy rules can be found to make the economy follow an arbitrarily stable path, 
based on an arbitrary set of eigenvalues. This is the rational expectations extension of the 
standard stabilisability theorem for backward looking or physical systems.7
                                                
7 Wonham (1974). 
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Proposition 4:
For any economy represented by (1), with arbitrary matrices A, B and C, we can always find a 
set of policy rules, , such that the controlled economy is stabilisable (up to an 
arbitrary set of eigenvalues)  if the economy itself is controllable in the sense of proposition 2. 
1/11/ ?? ttt yKx
Proof: Equation (1), with arbitrary coefficient matrices A, B and C, can be reduced to its final 
form (2). Substituting the policy rule 1/11/ ?? ttt yKx  for each t = 1….T shows that the 
controlled economy will behave as, similarly to (4), 
(6)
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? 1/
1/1
1/1
1/1
01
1
111
1/
1/1
.
.
.
.
.
0..0
0..
...
..0
0..0
...
...
...
...
...
.
.
.
TTTTTT
T
T b
b
y
y
y
K
K
RR
RR
y
y
where  Thus .01/0 yy ?
(7)    For 
an economy to be stabilisable at t, it must possess the property that it would return to the 
initially expected path, whatever the initial conditions and shocks experienced up to that 
point, if no further shocks or changes in expectations emerge (Wonham, 1974). That property 
clearly exists if the iteration matrix  has roots in the unit circle. 
But will follow any arbitrarily stable path if we can pick  so as to imply an 
arbitrary set of eigenvalues for that matrix. Suppose we choose the iteration matrix 
where  is a diagonal matrix of the chosen eigenvalues. Then, so long as t > n 
and hold, we can calculate the required  from the generalized 
inverse and apply a block diagonalisation to the result.
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Comments:
8 A block diagonalisation exists since (Rt,t-n….Rt,t)+D is square, and the Jordan canonical form exists. 
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i) Policies that imply stabilisability are obviously not unique, even if the choice of ?  is 
unique. We could have used policies further in the past, or policy announcements about the 
future, from the second and third terms in (7) to derive proposition 4 (given T ? n). In any 
case, the generalised inverse is not unique. 
ii) As a result, we can infer that a rational expectations model that is dynamically control-able 
at t = 1, as in proposition 2, is also stabilisable from t = 1. In that sense proposition 4 
generalizes on Wonham’s original theorem where stabilisability is achieved for the first time 
in period n.
3.4 An extra generalization 
If only a subset of the variables in each vector are genuine targets of policy (say s of them), 
then we may delete the n ??s rows from each , and from the blocks of policy 
multipliers  that correspond to the non-target variables, before moving on to evaluate 
our controllability conditions. 
ty
ty
Ttt RR .1, ....
The static controllability condition will now be s = m, and that the condensed R matrix just 
constructed should have rank sT. But it is no longer possible to characterize the sufficient 
condition part of the problem in terms of the elements of C (or of and C). Nevertheless it 
will be easier to control this subset of immediate policy targets, than it is to control the whole 
economy. 
TT
For dynamic controllability, we follow the same logic and apply proposition 2 to the 
condensed system. We get, as a sufficient condition, sRRr stt ?).....( ,1,  for controllability over 
the interval [1, t] – implying dynamic controllability from the first period as before. Once 
again, it is easier to control the subset of target variables than to control the entire economy by 
period t.
4. Concluding remarks. 
This paper was set up to determine the conditions under which policies can still affect the 
outcomes, and hence private sector expectations, when economic performance and policy 
choices are influenced by rationally chosen forward looking expectations; and, equally, to 
determine the conditions under which the outcomes cannot be controlled, or private sector 
expectations managed, so as to achieve certain objectives. Our key result is that policy targets 
10
can be controlled, and expectations managed through the policy process, as long as the 
forward dynamics (from private expectations of future outcomes) and the backward dynamics 
(from past policies/outcomes) do not interact to imply a unit root. If no unit root is implied, 
then expectations can be managed to increase controllability in the conventional sense and 
also to make policies more effective from an earlier date. But if there is a unit root, it means 
that the forward and backward dynamics exactly offset the status quo – so that the anticipated 
and feedback effects of a policy change exactly cancel out in their impact on current 
outcomes. Therefore, policies can have no effect.  
       This explains our results: the unit root comes from the matrix product AB in equation (1), 
where A controls the effect of past decisions and outcomes as chosen by the policy makers, 
and B the effect of expected future outcomes as anticipated by the private sector. Only where 
there is a conflict between the two, such that the influence of the expectations exactly offsets 
the planned changes to the existing state, will policy become ineffective. This invariance 
result should therefore be attributed to a conflict between agents and policymakers; a conflict 
which may take place if the private sector can set their expect-ations to have a sufficient effect 
on the policymakers’ targets (since there is obviously no incentive to align expectations with 
targets over which the authorities have no control), rather than to myopia or ill-intentions by 
the latter. But that has to be a special case. Otherwise, if the authorities satisfy the rank 
condition in proposition 3 (so that they do have controllability in the usual sense), 
expectations can be managed: that is, brought into line to assist with what the policymakers 
intend to achieve. 
       Thus, although we have shown that rational expectations can make it impossible for the 
policymaker to affect the outcomes in certain economic models due to policy invariance, or 
time inconsistency, this is not a general result. In fact it will only happen if the matrix product 
AB has a unit root, or if the rank condition in proposition 3 fails.9 Both conditions depend on 
particular parameter values; so neither will hold in general. Hence rational expectations do 
not, in themselves, prevent controllability in either its static or its dynamic form. On the 
contrary, they will typically enhance the effectiveness of economic policy. However, there are 
two special cases where rational expectations do create policy invariance: the long run 
Phillips curve and New Keynesian models without persistence (in both cases where inflation 
reacts one-for-one to changes in expected inflation, as is conventionally assumed). In the 
                                                
9 There could still be particular values of A and C such that the introduction of B?0 makes (Rt,1….Rt,n) have less 
than full rank when, with B=0, (Rt,1….Rt,n) had had full rank. Although this could happen by chance with certain 
parameter values, it cannot be a general outcome.  In any case, in that situation there would be a problem of the 
non-existence of the underlying equilibrium. 
11
former case, B = 0 and A is diagonal with a unit element in one position.10 Although the 
inverse in (2) still exists, it is a companion matrix and the border elements do not decay as 
T??. Consequently the policymakers cannot have controllability in the long run, though they 
may well have it in the short to medium term. The same happens in the New Keynesian 
model; now A = 0, and B is diagonal with a unit element.11 Again, and for the same reason, 
policymakers will not have controllability as T?? although they may have it for shorter 
horizons.12
       The implications of our results are important. All dynamic problems that imply the 
achievement of a given target at a certain moment of time – such as fiscal consolidation, or 
the achievement of a set of macroeconomic targets as a pre-requisite to creating a currency 
union – will find an important ally in the existence of rational expectations if dynamic 
controllability is satisfied. The policy problem is no longer a matter of how to find a credible 
commitment, but of when the policy changes should be announced given the economy’s lag 
structure. Similarly, policy announcements become useful instruments for stabilizing an 
economy hit by temporary shocks since, under either static or dynamic controllability, the 
stabilisability property in backward looking models generalizes to forward looking models 
and allows a sequence of stabilising actions to become effective from an earlier point. 
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Appendix: A Generalization to Multiple Leads and Lags 
We now consider a general linear rational expectations model, with p lags and q lead or 
expectations terms. This can be converted to a first order model, such as in (1), as follows. 
The (p, q) model is of the form: 
(A1) t = 1,….,Ttttttt vCxyLByLAy ????
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and   with  are both polynomials in the lag operator 
 In such a model, we can rewrite (A1) by stacking the variables as follows: 
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or, in obvious notation, 
(A3)  tttttt vCxyByAy ???? ?? /11
~~~~
which is in exactly the same form as the model set out in (1) of the main text. 
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